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AN INTRODUCTION TO TAX INCENTIVES TO INVESTMENT 
IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
INTRODUCTION 
China's recent emphasis upon achieving modernization1 has 
prompted a continued effort to import "up-to-date technology." 
Such "technology" would include management techniques and 
labor training, as well as advanced equipment and machinery.2 
There are several ways in which the importation of tech-
nology can be achieved. One method would call for purchasing 
the desired technology from other nations. Another method 
would be to establish enterprises with those who possess the 
technology and learn the technology from them through coopera-
tion in the enterprise. This second method also offers the 
1 The P.R.C. is in the process of developing its economy, military, and 
standard of living. For example, the 1979 Economic Plan emphasizes "the 
steady progress of the four modernizations." Qi uli, Arrangements for the 
1979 National Economic Plan, BEIJING REV., July 20, 1979, at 7. 
2 See, ~, Article 5 of the Joint Ventures Act, which states: 
"The technology or equipment contributed by any Foreign Participant 
as an investment shall be truly advanced and appropriate to China's 
needs. In cases of losses caused by deception through the inten-
tional provision of outdated equipment or technology, compensation 
shall be paid for the losses." 
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possibility that the host country could acquire technology by 
contracting to take over the assets and operation of the joint 
enterprise after the contract has expired and the foreign 
partner has made a certain profit from the venture. 3 Both 
parties would be willing to enter into an arrangement like 
this because the foreign investor would have made a profit on 
his investment and the host country would have acquired the 
technology it sought, as well as the capital equipment neces-
sary for industrial expansion. 
Both of the methods referred to above are being used by 
the P.R.C. today. In fact, both methods are being promoted by 
the newly instituted tax system in the P.R.C. The tax reve-
nues collected by the tax system allow the P.R.C. to use the 
first method and buy directly. Tax incentives serve to use 
the alternate method of attracting enterprises to China so the 
P . R. C . may learn from them. Thi s article focuses on the 
inducement to foreign investment offered by the Chinese tax 
system. 
To see how the tax system attracts investment it is 
necessary to adequately define what a tax incentive is. The 
term "tax incentives" as used here means financial inducements 
made through the tax system. Tax incentives may be seen as 
.additional interest or return on investments encouraged by the 
government, which are provided by exempting or reducing taxes 
on income that would otherwise be collected. with tax incen-
tives the government foregoes tax revenues it would otherwise 
have collected in order to induce investment. One example of 
a tax incentive used in the P.R.C. is a reduction of the tax 
rate. If a tax rate is reduced the tax owed by an investor to 
the P.R.C. will decrease proportionally. His after-tax income 
is therefore greater than it would have been without the tax 
incentive. Thus, if the tax the investor must pay is lowered, 
he would be more likely to invest in the host country. 
3 In China this is known as a "contractual joint venture." 
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In general, tax incentives may be offered through domes-
tic laws, individual contracts between the government and the 
foreign investor, and through tax treaties with other coun-
tries. This article will look primarily at domestic laws and 
individual agreements since there are no tax treaties covering 
enterprises at this time. 
By instituting tax incentives the P.R.C. has struck a 
balance between potential tax revenues and the investments 
which the tax incentives will attract. The balance was struck 
through the development of a new tax designed to deal with 
foreign investment in the form of joint ventures using Chinese 
and foreign capital. This new tax has had to work in conjunc-
tion with the pre-existing taxes in China. It will be seen 
later in this study how, in some cases, the old taxes may have 
to bend in order to allow the new taxes to attract foreign 
investment and joint participation in capital ventures. 4 
since 1950 the P.R.C. has had a tax system primarily 
designed to facilitate the collection of revenues from domes-
tic private enterprises. The system also allowed the P.R.C. 
to exercise a modicum of control over private and collective 
enterprises in China. 5 This system was "inward looking" in 
that it was oriented toward the domestic needs of the nation 
at the time the P. R. C. was formed. Presumably, it did not 
contemplate foreign investment in China, since it made no 
special provision for foreign investment in the P.R.C. 
Since the death of Mao, there has been a basic policy 
change toward an "outward looking" position. In short, the 
4 In particular, we will see how the Consolidated Industrial & Commercial 
Income Tax's jurisdiction is limited to permit the Joint Ventures Income 
Tax to have\ole jurisdiction over joint ventures with Chinese and foreign 
capital. 
S Some of this control is suggested in the following articles: Reynolds, 
Doing Business with the People's Republic of Chin~: Tax Considerations, 14 
INT'L LAWYER 49 (1980); Ting, Preliminary Notes on Taxation in the People's 
Republic of China, S REV. SOCIALIST L. 347 (1979), 1 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. 
J. 71 (1980). 
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Chinese are encouraging foreign investment and participation. 
As previously noted, this shift appears to spring from their 
desire to import "up-to-date" technology. To enable foreign-
ers to enter and deal with China on terms familiar to foreign-
ers, certain domestic laws have had to be changed in order to 
conform to international commercial standards and expectations. 
Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance obtained advice from 
foreign tax specialists6 on possible ways of restructuring 
their tax system. This was a difficult task since they wished 
7 to keep their domestic-oriented tax system in place. As a 
result, new tax laws have had to work with and around the old 
tax laws. In the development of the new tax laws, confusion 
arose as to the way in which the new taxes would operate, both 
independently from, and in conjunction with the old domestic 
laws of the P.R.C. 
This article will attempt to penetrate the confusion that 
has arisen around the Chinese tax laws by providing an over-
view of the tax laws and concomitant "tax incentives." 
In Part 1 of this article, the division between national 
and local taxes is described in order to point out the differ-
ent levels of control and taxation: one on the national, and 
one on the l08al (or provincial) level. Each level serves a 
different function with respect to investment in China. 
National taxes and incentives influence decisions to invest in 
the P.R.C. as a whole. Local taxes influence decisions as to 
where in China (which province) an investor will invest or 
establish a business. 
6 See Pomp & Surrey, Taxation in the People's Republic of China, in NEW 
YORK PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, NEW LOOK AT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS 
IN CHINA, at 361 (1979) [hereinafter cited as NEW LOOK]. See also modi-
fied version in 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1979). 
7 The P.R.C., as would any country, sought to keep its domestic tax system 
in place in order to keep an orderly system running rather than disrupting 
business with the creation of an entirely new network of taxes. The 
domestic system had served the objectives the P.R.C. sought in a manner 
which suited their society. 
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Part 1 will examine the national sales and income taxes 
that are applicable to Chinese ventures. From there I will 
discuss the income taxes applicable to the joint ventures form 
of foreign investment. In Part II the tax incentive effects 
of the latter taxes will be discussed in further detail. 
Part I TAXES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Developing countries have taxed enterprises on (1) capital 
formation, (2) existence, and (3) termination or amalgamation. 8 
China has chosen to tax only the existence of enterprises. No 
initial "capital formation" tax exists. There is not even a 
fee for incorporation. with regard to liquidation, the only 
requirements are that all debts are satisfied and that regi-
stration of termination is made with the General Administra-
tive Bureau for Industry and Commerce of the People's Republic 
of China. 9 
Taxes on the existence of enterprises exist at both the 
national and local levels. Local tax rates are usually a set 
8 Briefly, "capital formation" means the "bringing together of business 
capital." XIII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW CR. 11 
(TAXATION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION) (1974). Under auspices of the Inter-
national Association of Legal Science. 
Taxes on capital formation may include taxes imposed upon the regi-
stration or recording of legal documents. Id. 
Taxes on existence may include income taxes, property taxes, and 
sales taxes (such as the turnover taxes). Id. 
Taxes on termination of an enterprise are usually taxes on the "gain 
of final results of carrying on business." Id. In most cases these 
"gains" are from the sale of "capital assets" which were not taxed during 
the "existence" of the enterprise. 
Taxes on "amalgamation" are taxes on the merger or consolidation of 
enterprises. For tax purposes, some countries treat the amalgamation as 
if the enterprises were terminated. The gain from the termination would 
be taxed. Other countries do not treat amalgamation this way for tax 
purposes. Id. 
For an excellent discussion of these concepts I would recommend XIII 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, Ch. 11, at 11-13. 
9 See the appropriate provision in the Joint Ventures Incomes Tax Law, 
art. 11. 
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percentage of the national tax payments. In most cases the 
local government has control over the local rates, wi thin 
limits specified by the national government. 
A basic understanding of the national and local tax 
systems will be necessary to recognize and understand the tax 
incentives in effect in China today. There are two types of 
taxes on enterprise existence that are used in the P.R.C.: 
income taxes and sales taxes. These two types of taxes, which 
exist at both the national and local level, are discussed 
below. 
A. NATIONAL TAXES 
The national taxes are separate and autonomous taxes 
which interact to form a network of sales and income taxes. 
The national sales tax applies to all enterprises in China. 
In addition, a foreign or domestic enterprise in China will be 
subject to an income tax. If it is a domestic Chinese enter-
prise, it will be subj ect to the Consolidated Industrial and 
Commercial Income Tax. If it is a joint venture with foreign 
investment it will probably be subject to the Joint Ventures 
Income Tax and not the Consolidated Income Tax. It is from 
and within these tax structures that the tax incentives which 
we will discuss a little later on are derived and must func-
tion. As we will see, difficulties seem to arise in the 
interaction of these separate tax structures. For instance, 
one may ask whether the Joint Ventures Income Tax replaces the 
Consolidated Income Tax as the income tax applicable to the 
enterprise, or whether it is imposed in addition to that tax. 
Al though the Joint Ventures Income Tax law itself does not 
speak to these questions, it seems more reasonable that it 
should replace the Consolidated Income Tax as the income tax 
applicable to joint ventures. These issues will be examined 
in greater detail later in this study. 
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1. National Sales Taxes 
China has one sales tax controlled by the national govern-
ment, the Consolidated Industrial & Commercial Tax (herein-
after cited as the CICT). The CICT is of central importance 
in any consideration of tax incentives because it is one of 
the heaviest tax burdens faced by an enterprise in China. The 
CICT is a "cascading" or "turnover" tax, which means it is 
collected each time an item in production is transferred from 
one person or enterprise to another. 10 In addition, the CICT 
is a "cumulative turnover tax". 11 This means that the total 
tax burden of the CICT is the sum of all CICT tax paid at each 
transfer. "No [tax] credit is provided for any tax previously 
paid on the purchase of goods or services. ,,12 The tax rates 
of the CICT range from 1.5% for necessities, to 69% for 
luxuries .13 But the effective overall rates under the CICT 
are actually much heavier than the aforementioned rates would 
indicate since the rate 1S applied again on each transfer. 
Because of this effect the CICT accounts for over three-
fourths of China's total revenues. 14 
The C.ICT may be thought of as a tax collected on each 
10 Gelatt, The Industrial and Commercial Tax: Its Impact on Forei.gg 
Investment, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REPORTS, Aug. 15, 1980, at 14. 
11 For an excellent discussion of "cumulative turnover taxes" and their 
effects on businesses,. see XIII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CO~IPARATIVE 
LAW, Ch. 11, at 11-12 et seq. This source also suggests an alternative 
form of turnover tax whichavoids the oppressive "cumulative" effects. 
The alternative is known as the Value Added Tax (V.A.T. or T.V.A.). The 
V.A.T. is a "multistage tax that is imposed at all or at several stages in 
the manufacturing and distribution process (and also on services rendered)." 
Id. at 22. It is distinguishable from the "cwnulative" tax in that "[t]ax 
paid at one stage, ... , is creditable against tax payable at a subse-
quent stage." Id. at 22. 
12 Pomp & Surrey, supra note 6, at 356. INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FISCAL 
DOCUMENTATION, TAXES AND INVESTMENT IN ASIAN AND THE PACIFIC (2d ed. 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as TAXES AND INVESTMENT]. 
13 TAXES AND INVESTMENT, supra note 12. 
14 Gelatt, supra note 10, at 14. 
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transfer of an unfinished item in production from one produc 
tion level with one firm or enterprise, to the next stage of 
production with another enterprise. Eventually, the finished 
item is sold to the retailer or to the consumer. This process 
encourages an enterprise to vertically integrate15 the various 
stages of production in order to avoid the CICT tax since no 
transfer outside the enterprise would occur in that case until 
the final sale to the retailer or consumer. 16 This effect may 
be unintended and may be subject to change since China now 
desires to develop smaller specialized production units over 
larger all-encompassing ones,17 and production of commercial 
d . 1 . 18· goo s over caplta constructlon. 
2. National Income Taxes 
The national income taxes of the P. R. C. may be broken 
down into three categories. In one category is the tax con-
cerning individuals. The second category contains the com-
mercial income tax applicable to domestic Chinese enterprises 
the Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Income Tax (herein-
after cited as the CICIT). The third category contains the 
tax applicable to joint ventures with Chinese and foreign 
investment, the Joint Ventures Income Tax. This last tax 
deserves particular attention because it is was grafted onto 
the old tax system (represented by the CICIT), and may 
15 
Vertical integration of a business is where all stages of production of 
an item are contained within one business entity. No transfers among the 
stages of production outside the business entity is required and therefore 
none will be taxed by the eIeT. Relative to products which have had to be 
transferred from one stage of production in one business entity to another 
step in production of another business entity, the products of a business 
entity with vertical integration possesses a distinct competitive advan-
tage from practical exemption from the eIeT. 
16 Pomp & Surrey, supra note 6. 
]7 
Gelatt, supra note 10, at 17. See Qiuli, Arrangements for the 1979 
National Economic Plan, BEIJING REV., July 20, 1979, at 7, 9. 
18 See Qiuli, supra note 17, at 12. 
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entirely replace that tax, with respect to "joint ventures. 11 19 
a. The Individual Income Tax 
China's more recent tax laws contain the first individual 
income tax in its history. Individual income taxes may affect 
companies in China because they affect those companies' emplo-
yees. Any reduction in the tax liability of the employees 
means the company need not pay more to employees to guarantee 
a certain after-tax income. 
The Joint ventures Act, article II, provides that foreign 
individuals may be taxed on their income from "wages, salaries, 
or other legitimate sources of income. II The more recent 
Individual Income Tax Law taxes personal income over 800 Yuan 
(U5$546) per month on all income. 20 For non-residents or 
individuals residing in China less than one year, they shall 
only be taxed on income gained wi thin China. After that 
period, all income accruing within or outside China may be 
taxed at rates up to 45%.21 Progressive rates from 5 to 45 
percent apply to wages and salaries. 22 A flat 20% rate applies 
19 In China the term joint venture seems to mean the partnership between 
Chinese and foreign investors to establish a certain type of enterprise. 
For these purposes the Chinese investors are branches of the government. 
20 
Individual Income Tax Law, art. 5. Bonavia, A Rubber Stamp for 
Stability, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., September 5, 1980, at 11. It has been 
noted that this limit will probably exempt all citizens of the PRC. See 
Loong, China leaves some grey areas, FAR EASTERN ECON. REV., Sept. 26-:::-
Oct. 2, 1980, at 108. 
Plainly, such high monthly earnings would be more likely to charac-
terize foreign investors and wage earners in the PRC. Contra, see 
Wallace, China's New Leap Forward: Free Enterprise, U.S. NE~ WORLD 
REPORT, Mar. 23, 1981, at 56, 58, where they quote the exemption limit at 
$58. This seems consistent with the fact that the Individual Income Tax 
was preceded by and alluded to in the Joint Ventures Act, the act that 
specifically dealt with foreign investors and investment in China. 
The new rate of conversion is 1.6 RMB to US $1. This means the 800 
RMB limit is now comparable to US $500. Note that the Yuan is also called 
Renmenbi (RMB). Conversation with Chancellory of the People's Republic of 
China and conversation with the National Council on U.S. -- China Trade, 
both on March 27, 1981. 
21 Individual Income Tax, article 3, § 1. 
22 Id. and its appended Tax Rate Chart. 
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to income from "royalties, personal services, interest, divi-
dends, bonuses and lease of property, and other kinds of 
. ,23 . h .. d 1 lncome. ' It has been sald t at the Indlvl ua Income Tax 
will be unenforceable because if enforced "it will lead to a 
monstrous loss of goodwill among foreign residents, who al-
ready consider themselves taxed enough. ,,24 
b. The Consolidated Industrial & Commercial Income Tax 
A second type of national income tax in the P. R. c. is 
that dealing with the existence of commercial enterprises. 
The oldest of these taxes is the Consolidated Industrial & 
Commercial Income Tax. (It is separate and distinct from the 
CICT, which is a sales tax.) The CICIT is the P.R.C.'s gene-
ral enterprise income tax. It was adopted in 1950 and con-
tinues to be applied today. 
The national tax rates of the CICIT range from 5.75% to 
34.5%. The rates are applied progressively on "income". 
"Income", in this context, is defined as the "amount of gross 
receipts 25 during the business year or actual period of busi-
ness remaining after deduction of costs, expenses, and 
losses. ,,26 Surrey and Pomp have noted that these deductions 
include "all costs of production, including the consolidated 
[CICT] tax, administrative expenses, and all other necessary 
27 . . 
expenses .... " Paul Reynolds has observed that depreclatlon 
23 
I d. art. 3, § 2. 
24 . 
Bonavla, supra note 18. 
25 Pomp & Surrey use the term "gross income" in place of "gross receipts." 
Pomp & Surrey, supra note 6. Others have said that the tax base is the 
change in "net worth." TAXES AND INVESTMENT, ~~ note 12, at C.2.1.4.1., 
at 77. 
26 Article 18 of the Industrial & Commercial Income Tax Law and Regula-
tions, adopted in final form December 19, 1950 by the Government Admini-
stration Council of the People's Republic of China, translation rCilrinted 
in Reynolds, supra note 5, at 70. 
27 
Pomp & Surrey, supra note 6, at 369. 
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on a straight line method fixed by the government is also 
permi tted as a deduction from "gross receipts. ,,28 Notably, 
Surrey and others have stated that there is no separate capi-
tal gains tax. Dispositions of "capital assets" such as 
"hidden reserves" are included as gains or losses of ordinary 
inccime. 29 
c. The Joint Ventures Income Tax 
While the CICIT is an income tax on domestic enterprises, 
prior to 1979 the P.R.C. did not have a special income tax for 
foreign investment. In August of 1980, the P.R.C. adopted the 
INCOME TAX LAW OF THE PEOPLE I S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONCERNING 
JOINT VENTURES WITH CHINESE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT (herein-
after cited as the JVIT) to govern foreign investment through 
joint ventures. By using a separate law the P.R.C. has been 
able to offer a set of provisions that offer tax incentives 
for foreign investment without conflicting with the function-
ing of the domestic income tax system. 
The development of a foreign venture income tax has 
passed through three stages. In chronological order, these 
are (1) the LAW OF THE PEOPLE I S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON JOINT 
VENTURES USING CHINESE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT (hereinafter 
cited as the JVA)i (2) the JVITi and (3) the DETAILED RULES 
AND REGULATIONS FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INCOME TAX LAW 
OF THE PEOPLE I S REPUBLIC OF CHINA CONCERNING JOINT VENTURES 
WITH CHINESE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT (hereinafter cited as the 
Detailed Rules and Regulations of the JVIT). These laws 
contain the tax incentives (discussed ih Part II) specifically 
designed to attract foreign investment. 
In designing the JVIT the P.R.C. had to work with and 
around the concepts of pre-existing domestic tax laws. These 
earlier tax concepts had to be manipulated and refined in 
28 Reynolds, supra note 5, at 61. 
29 Pomp & Surrey, supra note 6, at 368; TAXES AND INVESTMENT, supra note 
6, at C.2.1.4.1., at 77. 
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developing the JVIT. One such concept to be juggled was the 
concept of taxable income. 30 This concept shall act as the 
common thread integrating the following discussion of the 
three stages of the development of China's new foreign venture 
tax laws. 
The first of the laws dealing with foreign investment is 
the Joint ventures Act, enacted by the National People's 
Congress in 1979. The JVA is a general statement of princi-
ples concerning j oint ventures with foreign investment in 
China. It announces a shift in policy from one of isola-
tionism to one of encouraging foreign investment in China. 
Article 1 of the JVA states: 
with a view to expanding international economic 
cooperation and technological exchange, the People's 
Republic of China permits foreign companies, enter-
prises, or other economic entities or individuals •.. 
to incorporate themselves, within the territory of 
the [P.R.C.], into joint ventures with Chinese 
companies, enterprises or other economic entities .•. 
on the principle of equality and mutual benefit and 
subject to authorization by the Chinese government. 
The JVA also announces the P. R. C. ' s desire to import 
foreign technology through cooperation in ·business enter-
prises. Article 5 of the JVA states: 
The technology or equipment contributed by any 
Foreign Participant as investment shall be truly 
advanced and appropriate to China's needs. In cases 
of losses caused by deception through the intentional 
provision of outdated equipment or technology, 
compensation shall be paid for the losses. 
30 The definition of what is meant by taxable income is important in 
determining the amount of tax payable and the effective rate of taxation 
as compared with other countries. The lower taxable income is, the lower 
the tax payable, and the lower the effective tax rate will be. Taxable 
income will vary depending on what is included, excluded, and deducted 
from gross income to arrive at taxable income. In the joint ventures laws 
the term taxable income has been defined differently in each law. It was 
first defined as "gross profits," and later as "net income." The dif-
ference in definition may be explained as part of the development of the 
income tax applicable to joint ventures. This process is explored below. 
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In addition, the Joint Ventures Act seems to envision a 
way of using the P.R.C. 's domestic tax system to encourage 
foreign investment and the use of new technology. Reductions, 
exemptions and restitution of income taxes are mentioned in 
the Act as rewards for such behavior. 31 
Article 7 of this act makes it clear that the P.R.C. will 
tax enterprises with foreign investment on income earned in 
China. It stated that joint ventures will be taxed on their 
"gross profits". The term "gross profits" is officially 
defined as: 
[Gross ·Sales] minus [all expenses during production 
(e. g. -- wages, production costs, & depreciationjl 
minus [Commercial & Industrial taxes [the CICT]]. 
"Gross profits" were probably chosen as the tax base 
because they are easier to compute and administer. This is a 
common reason why less developed countries which do not have 
the tax bureaucracy to implement more complex techniques, tend 
to use "gross income" as the tax base. 
The Joint Ventures Act also makes clear that a lesser 
rate of taxation will apply to those enterprises equipped with 
up-to-date technology. Article 7 of the JVA states, in part, 
"[a] joint venture equipped with up-to-date technology by 
world standards may apply for a reduction of or exemption from 
income tax for the first two or three profit making year." 
The Joint Ventures Income Tax (JVIT) was adopted by the 
National People's Congress in August of 1980. It is based 
upon the policy statements contained in the Joint Ventures 
Act, and provides additional detail on the special taxes joint 
ld b b · 33 ventures wou e su ]ect to. 
31 Art. 7 of the Joint Ventures Act. 
32 Maruyama, China's System of Economic Management and Its Impact on 
Joint Ventures, CHINA NEWSLETTER (No. 26), June 1980, at 3, 12. 
33 Whereas the CICT and CICIT are general taxes and may apply to all 
enterprises in China, the JVIT, while coexistent with these other taxes, 
is applicable only to those enterprises which are joint ventures. 
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Under the Joint Ventures Income Tax, joint ventures will 
as a rule be taxed at an overall rate of 33%. Different 
(presumably lower) rates apply to joint ventures "exploiting 
petroleum, natural gas, and other resources" of China. 34 
The tax base is defined in the JVIT as the "net income of 
a j oint venture in a tax year after deduction of costs, ex-
penses and losses in that year. 35 
This definition of taxable income appears to be a change 
from the "gross profits" tax base mentioned in the Joint 
Ventures Act. The change may be seen as part of the develop-
ment 0 f the income tax for j oint ventures. The P. R. C. may 
have used the term "gross profits" in the JVA for want of a 
better term, or as a provisional term to be used until they 
could decide more definitely what they wanted to include in 
the tax base for joint ventures. 36 This would seem to be 
consistent with the further definition of taxable income 
contained in the recently issued rules and regulations on the 
implementation of the JVIT law. 
Ih December of 1980 the P.R.C. issued Detailed Rules and 
Regulations for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of 
the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint Ventures with 
Chinese and Foreign Investment (hereinafter Detailed Rules and 
37 
Regulations of the JVIT). 
Under these rules and regulations taxable income is 
computed according to formulas that differ depending on whe-
ther the enterprise is engaged in industry, commerce, or 
34 Art. 3, § 2 of the Joint Ventures Income Tax Law. 
35 Art. 3 of the Joint Ventures Income Tax Law. 
36 It may be noted that the definition of "gross profits" appears to be 
very similar to the definition of "income" (the income tax base) of the 
Consolidated Industrial & Commercial Income Tax. It therefore seems that 
the term "gross profits" could have been borrowed from the CICIT. 
37 
The full impact of the Detailed Rules & Regulations on joint ventures 
in China offers a fertile field for further critical analysis. 
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service trades. These regulations seek to define net income 
in each of these areas. A comparison of "gross profits" under 
the .CICIT definition and "net income" as used in the Detailed 
Rules and Regulations reveals that the definition of taxable 
"net income" is at once more specific and of wider scope than 
the "gross profits" definition referred to above. "Net income" 
includes "non-operating income" profit from other operations, 
which the term "gross profits" does not, as well as gross 
sales (also included in "gross profits"). 
One item in the Detailed Rules and Regulations of the 
JVIT of importance to businessmen is the subtraction, from 
taxable income, of amounts previously paid for sales (CICT) 
taxes. Such subtraction lowers the tax base on which the 
income tax operates and, naturally, reduces the tax liability 
of the enterprise. 
3. CONFLICTS AMONG THE NATIONAL TAXES 
The degree of foreign ownership and management may deter-
mine the kind and degree of tax imposed upon an enterprise. 
While the JVA specifies that foreign investment must be at 
least 25% of the capital of the joint venture, it does not 
specify the maximum percentage of foreign ownership that the 
P.R.C. will allow in a joint venture. A foreign investor may 
f . 1 . . 38 be allowed to own over 50% 0 the caplta of a ]Olnt venture. 
As noted previously, the P.R.C. would probably like to retain 
a 'minimum amount of management control over a venture. In 
this way, the Chinese partners could learn directly from the 
foreign partners about the technology and business techniques 
involved. Such control would also allow the P.R.C. to deter-
mine to some extent the course of conduct of enterprises in 
China. 
38 Speech by Vice-Premier Li, cited in Buxbaum, Continuity and Change in 
China's Legal Theory and Practice Affecting Importing and Other Aspects of 
Foreign Trade, in NEW YORK PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, NEW LOOK AT LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 439, 447 (1979). 
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The JVA does not cover enterprises owned wholly by 
foreign investors. The P.R.C. would probably prefer to have 
controlling interest in all ventures. However, it now appears 
that the P. R. C. wants to obtain "up-to-date technology" even 
if it is through wholly foreign-owned enterprises. 39 Recent 
, , 1 1 ' t ' h' 40 leglslatlon wou d a low such enterprlses to opera e ln C lna. 
In addition, special economic zones in coastal areas have been 
established to facilitate the establishment of foreign-owned 
, , ,41 '11 b d' d enterprlses on Chlnese sOlI. These zones Wl e lscusse 
in further detail later in this article. 
At present it remains unsettled which taxes and tax 
incentives should apply to wholly foreign-owned enterprises. 
However, if no new legislation is enacted on the subject, it 
may be assumed that ., foreign residents and businesses they 
manage shall pay taxes according to the laws of the PRC . .,42 
At the time this regulation was written the taxes it referred 
to were the CICIT and the CICT, so it seems that 100% foreign-
owned enterprises should be subj ect to the CICIT and CICT. 
An exemption from the CICT and CICIT may be bargained for 
, ,,43 " , ln contract negotlatlons. The P.R.C. lS grantlng exemptlons 
from the consolidated taxes [CICT and CICIT] on an experi-
mental basis. 44 
It is notable that the language of the JVA can be inter-
preted to require the application of the CICT and the CICIT 
39 See id, at 448, This willingness may be seen in the Regulations on 
Special lfconomic Zones in Guangdong Province, Beijing, September 2, 1980 
(Xinhua), 
40 Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province, supra note 
37, 
41 Id, 
42 Art, 9, Regulations on the Administration of National Taxation (quan 
guo shui zheng shi shi yao ze), 31 January 1950, C. KUO-CHDN, I ECONOMIC 
PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION IN MAINLAND CHINA 226 (1959), 
43 , 
~ee Gelatt, supra note 10; Maruyama, supra note 31, at 12. 
44 
Maruyama, supra note 31, at 12. 
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regardless of the degree of foreign control. Article 2 of JVA 
states that "all acti vi ties of a j oint venture shall be go-
verned by the laws, decrees and pertinent rules and regula-
tions of the People's Republic of China." This statement is 
used in several of the laws of the PRC and is confusing. Does 
it mean that a joint venture will be exposed to the CICIT and 
CICT or does it merely suggest that it shall be subject to 
other laws such as those on labor, contracts, and criminal law 
not specified in this law? A broad construction of the lan-
guage of Article 2 appears to suggest that joint ventures will 
be subject to both the CICIT and the CICT, which are "rules 
and regulations" of the P. R. C. However, j oint ventures pro-
bably should not be subject to the CICIT for the following 
reason. The express purpose of the JVIT is to afford special 
treatment to those joint ventures which will contribute to 
China's technological development. The low tax rates offered 
by the JVIT will be negated if it is to be applied in addition 
to the CICIT since, as we have seen, the overall CICIT rates 
are almost twice that of the JVIT. In light of the avowed 
purpose of the JVIT, (i. e., to attract foreign investment in 
the form of joint ventures), a more reasonable interpretation 
of Article 2 would require that the JVIT replace the CICIT as 
the income tax applicable to joint ventures with foreign 
investment. 
On the other hand, it appears that joint ventures will 
still be exposed to the sales tax (the CICT). The Detailed 
Rules and Regulations for the implementation of the JVIT make 
specific provision for the deduction of the sales tax. Al-
though it is possible to negotiate for an exemption from the 
CICT, the few contracts to date seem to indicate that the 
Chinese want to leave open the possibility that joint ventures 
will be subject to this tax. As mentioned before, the exemp-
tions from the CICT seem to be allowed on an experimental 
basis only. Of course, enterprises which have not obtained an 
exemption by contract negotiations may still enjoy an effec-
ti ve exemption if the. Chinese tax authorities decide to forgo 
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collection of this sales tax. While this possibility is con-
sistent with the grant of experimental exemptions to some 
foreign investors, it is not yet a demonstrated custom. 
To sum up, the degree of foreign ownership does at least 
determine which income tax will apply to an enterprise. If 
the enterprise is a j oint venture with some Chinese capital 
and control, then the JVIT should be the applicable tax. If 
the enterprise is wholly foreign owned, then in the absence of 
new legislation on the subject, the CICIT should be the appli-
cable income tax. 
B. LOCAL TAXES 
An enterprise in the P.R.C. will encounter not only 
national but local taxes as well. The term "local taxes" 
refers to the taxes levied separately by the governments of 
provinces or their subdivisions. Local taxes provide funds 
for the operation of local government and local proj ects. 
The national government may set the maximum and minimum 
limi ts on the percentage of the national tax that will be 
allowed as a local tax or surcharge. wi thin these limits, 
local governments have control over how much of the percentage 
45 
they can demand as local taxes. 
As is true of the national government, the local govern-
ments may obtain revenue through sales and income taxes. In 
the case of sales taxes there is a one percent local surcharge 
on the amount of consolidated sales tax (CICT) paid to the 
national government. Although this surcharge does not appear 
in the national CICT regulations it has been used for quite 
. 1 46 some t1.me as a source of revenue for ocal governments. 
In addition to the local sales tax there are also local 
45 As we shall see in Part II [p. 146], this enables local officials to 
offer tax incentives to attract investment to their province. 
46 See Pomp & Surrey, supra note 6. 
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income taxes. These are local surcharges on the amounts of 
national income taxes paid to the national government. The 
first local income tax on enterprises was the local counter-
part to the consolidated income tax (CICIT). As we have seen, 
this is the income tax applied to domestic Chinese enter-
prlses. The local CICIT surcharge may be anywhere from ten to 
one hundred percent of the actual CICIT paid to the national 
government. 47 
The second and most recent local income tax is the one 
collected from j oint ventures. The JVIT law permits local 
governments to impose a local surcharge up to, but not to 
exceed, 10% of the actual amount of JVIT tax paid to the 
national government. 48 The local JVIT surcharge should re-
place the CICIT surcharge for qualified joint enterprises. 
~ART II TAX INCENTIVES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
A. NATIONAL TAX INCENTIVES 
As noted earlier, tax incentives are financial induce-
ments to investment which are offered through reductions in 
the tax owed to the P.R.C. Turning from our discussion of the 
functions of the Chinese tax laws, we now focus our inquiry 
upon the tax incentives present in those laws. We shall 
follow the development of these incentives in chronological 
order. 
Prior to 1979 there were no codified tax incentives in 
the P.R.C. Any tax incentives that were made available had to 
be bargained for in direct contract negotiations. Since 1979, 
the P.R.C. has attempted to use rate reductions, tax exemp-
tions, deductions of items from taxable income, tax refunds, 
47 TAXES AND INVESTMENT, supra note 6. 
48 Since the national JVIT rate is 30%, the actual local rate applied 
against national income is 3%, 10% of 30% being 3%. Total overall JVIT 
tax rate, the sum of national and local taxes, is therefore 33%. 
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tax credits, and other forms of tax incentives. 
Tax incentives in China fall within two categories: 
foreign and domestic. The foreign tax incentives are con-
tained wi thin the Joint Ventures Act and the Joint Ventures 
Income Tax Law. They were specifically intended to attract 
foreign capital, trade, and technology to China. 
Domestic tax incentives are contained with China's domes-
tic-oriented tax system, i.e. -- the CICIT and CICT. certain 
tax advantages for foreign enterprises and investments may be 
seen in the CICT and CICIT. However, since these domestic tax 
provisions were not specifically enacted to encourage foreign 
investment, these domestic tax incentives are not treated in 
this article. 49 In the following, we shall examine the incen-
tives provided by the joint ventures laws. 
The Joint Venture Incentives 
The joint ventures laws cover two forms of joint ventures. 
The largest group (by number of enterprises approved) is 
called the contractual joint venture. Under this type of 
joint venture the "foreign firms [partners] provide funds and 
equipment, while the Chinese side is responsible for land, 
factory premises, labor and management. The two parties share 
profi ts at an agreed ratio and all assets go to the Chinese 
side when the contract expires."SO 
49 Old laws may apply where enterprises are wholly owned by foreign inves-
tors since joint ventures laws would not apply. Domestic laws such as the 
CICIT and CICT provide incentives for the production of agricultural 
goods, and of industrial rather than commercial goods. Tax rates on these 
enterprises are lower than on enterprises producing non-agricultural or 
commercial goods. These tax incentives were established at a time when 
the PRC was seeking to build up its heavy industries. Compare this with 
the present emphasis on light industries. They also protect nascent 
enterprises. As we saw earlier, the domestic laws may also protect foreign 
owned enterprises by exempting them from the CICT. 
50 
Joint Enterprises Development with Foreign Firms, Beij ing (Xinhua) in 
Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, 12 December 1980, at L9. One 
would expect that in a contractual j oint venture the foreign investor 
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The other type of joint venture the P.R.C. has approved 
(in far fewer numbers) is called the equity joint venture. In 
this type of joint venture, "both Chinese and foreign partners 
provide capital, management and share risks as well as profit 
and loss. ,,51 This form of j oint venture is not as highly 
favored as the contractual j oint venture because its .assets do 
not all go to the Chinese partner at the end of the contract. 
The relationship between the partners continues until assets 
are divided and distributed. We may recall here that article 7 
of the Joint Ventures Act provides for the reduction or exemp-
tion from income tax for the first two or three profit-making 
years of a joint venture equipped with up-to-date technology. 
It seems likely that those ventures approved would be the ones 
from. which the Chinese side would eventually obtain the tech-
nology. 
Article 7 also provides for the "restitution" of a part 
of income taxes for foreign participants who reinvest any part 
of their net profits within Chinese territory. These provi-
sions are expanded and clarified in the Joint Ventures Income 
Tax Law. 
The Joint Ventures Income Tax provides tax rates that are 
lower than the overall CICIT rates. The maximum overall JVIT 
rate is 33%. The national rate is 30% and the maximum local 
tax rate is 3%. The maximum CICIT rate is the sum of the 
maximum national CICIT rate of 34.5% and the maximum local 
rate (100% of the national CICIT) of 34.5%, or a total of 69%. 
Others have noted that the usual local tax is 60% of the 
national CICIT and have therefore calculated the effective 
overall CICIT tax rate as 55%.52 There is therefore an incen-
tive to joint ventures with foreign investment relative to 
would receive a higher percentage of the profits during the operation of 
the enterprise in order to compensate him for the loss of his share of the 
assets upon the termination of the enterprise. 
51 Id. 
52 See R Id t 5 eyno s, supra no e . 
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domestic enterprises. If the CICIT applies to wholly foreign 
owned enterprises, then the JVIT would also seem to encourage 
foreign investment in joint ventures relative to investment in 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Again, this may be part of 
the P. R. C. 's desire to have some degree of management level 
control over enterprises in China. 
The JVIT rates also have a relative incentive effect as 
compared to the taxes of other nations. The Joint Ventures 
Income Tax rate is "lower than the corporate tax 
ally used by Industrially developed nations.,,53 
the only major tax the enterprise in China faced 
rates gener-
If this were 
then the low 
joint ventures income tax would clearly be an inducement to 
invest in the PRC as opposed to other countries. However, 
there are other income and sales taxes that joint ventures and 
. 
other enterprises may be subject to, for example, the CICT and 
the CICIT. The addition of these other tax burdens may cancel 
the JVIT incentive effect by raising overall tax liability to 
that of other nations. The CICT and CICIT existed in China 
long before the JVIT was adopted and they are still in force 
today. As mentioned above, because an item in production may 
be taxed as many times as it is transferred in production, the 
sales tax (CICT) has the greatest impact on enterprises in 
China. 
The Joint Ventures Income Tax law also provides that 
newly established joint ventures scheduled to operate for a 
period of at least ten years may be exempted from income tax 
in the first profit making year and allowed a 50% reduction in 
the second and third profit-making years. 54 Although the JVA, 
article 7, states that the use of up-to-date technology would 
qualify a joint venture for the tax exemptions and reductions, 
the JVIT does not say anything about such technology. However, 
53 
Rasmussen & The<oux, China's New Tax Laws for Joint Ventures and Indivi-
duals, CHINA BUS. REV., Nov. - Dec., 1980, at 36. 
54 . Jo~nt Ventures Income Tax law, article 5. 
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it does not appear likely that the P.R.C. will authorize joint 
ventures which do not use up-to-date technology.55 
Accordingly, most joint ventures operating under the JVIT 
should be using up-to-date technology. Article 5 of the JVIT 
woule therefore seem consistent with article 6 of the Joint 
Ventures Act. It would also seem to be a specification of 
what the exemptions and reduction would be for a joint venture 
equipped with up-to-date technology. 
Other tax laws have been enacted since 1979 which offer 
IIspecial provisions II for enterprises exploiting the natural 
f h · 56 h' 1 . resources 0 C 1na. T 1S wou d seem to be d1rected toward 
reducing China's dependence on imported fuel and raw materials. 
This action would also eventually cut down on initial costs 
for materials and would therefore lower the cost of finished 
products. In turn, this would make the finished products of 
China more competitive on the international markets. 
The national resources area is a good example of the way 
in which tax incentives are being used in place of direct 
expendi tures. To otherwise exploit these natural resources 
the P.R.C. might have to inject funds into a state enterprise 
or make a direct payment to the foreign company to induce it 
to exploit China's natural resources. By using tax incentives 
the P.R.C. can make it more attractive to a foreign investor 
to help ·the P. R. C. fill its own needs. 
Article 5, section 2, of the JVIT provides incentives for 
investment in such much needed but low profit earning activi-
ties as farming, forestry, and enterprises 1I1ocated in out-
57 lying underdeveloped areas. 1I Such low-profit operations are 
55 See note 1 supra. 
56 Bonavia, supra note 18. Art. 3, § 2 of the JVIT law. 
57 This additional incentive is aimed, in part, at correctin~ the lack of 
development and the underutilization of vast amounts of hard-to-reach 
areas in China. In the past, a lack of resources and the great distances 
involved in reaching these areas prevented the development of such areas. 
It may still not be feasible for enterprises to use these areas even given 
the tax incentives. 
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to be given a 15 to 30 per cent reduction in income tax for 
the fourth through fourteenth profit making years. This would 
be in addition to the exemption and reductions provided to all 
other enterprises for their first years of profit. 
Two provisions of the JVIT are directed at keeping invest-
ment in China for the long run. The first of these is article 
6 of the Joint Ventures Income Tax Law. It provides for a 40% 
refund of the amounts of tax on the profits reinvested by a 
joint venturer in China, if the reinvestment is not withdrawn 
for at least five years. A recapture clause for the full 
amount of taxes refunded is utilized if the funds reinvested 
are withdrawn before five years have passed. These provi-
sions, in effect, grant an extra measure of after-tax profit 
for funds reinvested in China. 
Article 7 of the JVIT is the second provision that is 
directed toward keeping investments in China. It provides 
that losses may be carried over to the next tax year and made 
up with a matching amount drawn from that year's income. 
There is a five year carry forward of any losses exceeding the 
income of that year. These provisions operate to maintain the 
investments in China by making reinvestments more attractive 
and subsidizing losses by allowing reduction of liability in 
later years. 
A final possible tax incentive in the domestic tax sphere 
is the accelerated depreciation of capital assets. To that 
end the P. R. C. has been experimenting with depreciation me-
thods . 58 While at present the P. R. C. usually only allows 
straight line depreciation, 59 joint ventures may apply for 
accelerated depreciation of fund assets. 60 Applications to 
use accelerated depreciation or to modify the depreciation 
58 Maruyama, supra note 31. 
59 
Detailed Rules and Regulations of the JVIT, article 12. 
60 
rd. art. 13. 
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method are to be submitted for examination by local tax au-
thorities and then "relayed level by level to the Ministry of 
Finance of the People's Republic of China for approval.,,6l An 
application could be tied up in review indefinitely. A lack 
of administrative resources to handle the bookkeeping and 
computation of many different depreciation methods would seem 
to be the reason behind the resistance to changes in method. 
However, if the P.R.C. wants the technology or services a 
foreign partner could offer then the joint venture could 
probably get approval of its depreciation method. In any 
event, if the depreciation of fixed assets is an important 
consideration of a foreign investor, as it may be in industry 
and construction, then it might be wise to negotiate this 
point and make application for a depreciation method before 
investing in China. 
~ll of the national tax incentives mentioned above indi-
cate that China is intent on developing plans for a stable 
environment for foreign investment. It seeks to reduce short-
term risks of losses by giving inducements in the early years 
f .. 62 . I . k h t I o a ] Ol.nt venture. In enterprl.ses 1. e t e con ractua 
joint venture, the foreign investor hopes to make a return on 
his investment in the early profit making years of the enter-
prise. A stable, low-risk environment in the short term is 
what he would probably look for to guarantee the investment 
and return. The tax incentives examined above provide induce-
ments for such enterprises. That is, tax breaks are granted 
for the early profit making years. 
Tax breaks at the local level also encourage this type of 
enterprise. We shall now briefly turn to this area of tax 
incentives. 
61 Id. 
62 See p. 142 supra. 
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B. LOCAL TAX INCENTIVES 
National tax incentives serve to draw foreign investment 
to China. In much the same manner local tax incentives may 
serve to draw investment to certain geographic areas (pro-
vinces) within China. 
As was noted above, local taxes are calculated as a 
percentage of the amount of national tax paid. Therefore, any 
reduction in national tax liability will result in the reduc-
tion of local tax liability. wi thin that framework local 
governments may independently offer local tax incentives to 
enterprises establishing themselves in their geographic area. 
These tax incentives are usually in the form of a reduction or 
exemption from the local surcharge on the national taxes for a 
set period of time. 
As previously noted [po 139, supra), the JVIT law permits 
local governments to impose a local surcharge up to, but not 
to exceed, 10% of the actual amount of JVIT taxes paid to the 
national government. The ten percent maximum limit on the 
local income tax for joint ventures compares favorably to the 
ten to one hundred percent local income tax surcharge limit 
for Chinese enterprises under the CICIT. In terms of actual 
rates operating on the national tax base, the JVIT rate is 3% 
(10% of the national tax rate of 30%), as compared with the 
average [using Reynold's figures) actual local CICIT rate of 
20.7% (60% of the maximum national tax rate of 34.5%). Thus, 
joint ventures are given a more preferable treatment on a 
local level than other enterprises. Local governments may 
increase or decrease the relative preference by varying the 
rates for each tax. For example, if local officials set the 
JVIT local surcharge at its maximum (10%), and the local CICIT 
surcharge at its minimum (10%) of the national tax, then there 
would be little preference. Conversely, if the local JVIT 
surcharge were set at its minimum (0%), and the local CICIT 
surcharge were set at its maximum (100% of the national tax), 
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then the preference would be at its greatest. Local officials 
can therefore exert influence on foreign investors' decisions 
to invest in their province. 
The aforementioned reductions and exemptions from local 
taxes a~e the only local tax incentives in the People's Repub-
lic of China at this time. There are, however, experimental 
projects in certain provinces which may offer lower tax rates 
than other local areas as well as possible exemptions from the 
national taxes. These projects, called the "special economic 
63 
zones, " present several tax related problems. These prob-
lems are explored below. 
C. SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
In 1980 the People's Republic of China established special 
experimental areas for the development of industry and trade. 
64 These are the special economic zones. One such special 
economic zone was established by the Regulations on Special 
Economic Zone in Guangdong Province. These regulations con-
tain for provisions applicable to enterprises in these zones. 
Special economic zones are a unique extension of the concept 
of attracting investment to a particular geographic area. The 
geographic areas involved in the special zones are coastal 
areas; areas which China has used in the past as trade zones 
for foreigners in China. The incentives the special zones 
offer may in fact be a hybrid of national and local tax incen-
tives. The special zones were established by the National 
People's Congress but like other local taxes and tax incen-
tives, the taxes in the special zones are, in application, 
controlled by local government. Unlike local taxes, the 
R~gulations on special zones may offer a potential exemption 
63 Regulations on the Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province [herein-
after cited as the Special Economic Zones Regulations]. 
64 Id. 
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from the national income taxes, offering in its place a re-
duced income tax rate of 15%. They may also offer exemption 
from the sales taxes, such as CICT. 
The regulations state that the "rate of income tax levied 
on the enterprises in the special zones is to be 15%." Presum-
ably this rate would replace the JVIT and CICIT as the income 
tax applicable to enterprises in the special zones. If it 
were not replaced in this manner the joint venture would be 
faced with a higher total income tax (30% national plus 15% 
local, total of 45%, as opposed to 33% regularly) than joint 
ventures outside special zones. 
Conflicts of Laws of Special Zones and National Taxes 
Difficulties concerning conflict of laws arise in deter-
mining which tax laws are applicable to foreign owned enter-
prises in special zones. Appropriate questions here would 
include whether these enterprises are subject to national 
taxes, or are merely subj ect to local taxes, or are merely 
subject to special zone tax rules. 65 The Act establishing the 
Guangdong Special Zone contains the provision stating "enter-
prises and individuals in the special zones must abide by the 
laws, decrees and related regulations of the People's Republic 
f . 66 o Chlna." 
This statement is similar to one contained in the JVIT. 
Unfortunately, its meaning remains ambiguous and confusing. 
The language of this provisions seems to indicate that enter-
prises in the special zones would be exposed to the JVIT and 
the Consolidated Industrial & Commercial Taxes since they are 
national laws. In support of this conclusion, it may be 
argued that since the special zone regulations do not have 
specific provisions exempting enterprises in the zone from 
65 
For example: Art. 14 of the Regulations on Special Economic Zones in 
Guangdong Province. 
66 rd. art. 2. 
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national taxe3, they are still subject to national taxes. 
However, the better view may be that the special zone regula-
tions take precedence over and perhaps to the exclusion of the 
national taxes, including the recent Joint ventures laws. 
According to this view, the provisions may merely reflect an 
attempt by the P.R.C. to cover itself in areas not specifical-
ly covered by the regulations. This would allow the Chinese 
to maintain jurisdiction over these areas. Such a provisions 
would make it clear that the laws of the P.R.C. in these areas 
must be followed in pursuing certain tax advantages. This 
view seems to be consistent with the intent of the subsequent 
provision of the Special Economic Zones Regulations. The 
provision indicates that the national taxes may not apply to 
enterprises in the special zones. It has been translated in 
at least two ways: first as, 1I ••• with the exception of special 
provisions as stipulated in these regulations. 1I67 and second-
lyas, lI[w]here there are specific provisions contained in the 
present regulations, they have to be observed as stipulated 
here. 11 68 These translations seem to indicate that the provi-
sions of the Special Economic Zones Regulations take prece-
dence over or replace national laws to the contrary. 
Since the regulations for the Special Economic Zones make 
specific provision for the applicable income tax, it would 
appear ,that the enterprises in the special zones may only be 
subject to the provisions of the Guangdon<;J special Economic 
Zone Regulations to the exclusion of the national Joint Ven-
tures and Consolidated Industrial & Commercial Income Taxes. 
This interpretation would seem consistent with the special 
zones regulations' stated purpose of developing II external 
economic cooperation and technical exchanges and promot[ing] 
67 Regulation on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province in Foreign 
Broadcasting Information Service, Vol. 1, 28 August 1980, at L 9. 
68 Regulations on Special Economic Zones in Guangdong Province, Beij ing 
(Xinhua) 2 September 1980, reprinted in 3 MONSOON, p. 11. 
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the socialist modernization program. [F]oreign citizens, ... 
and their companies and enterprises ... are encouraged to open 
factories or set up enterprises ... with their own investment 
d t k .. t t 'th h' . tm t .. 69 or un er a e J Ol.n ven ures Wl. C l.nese l.nves en .... 
This interpretation would suggest that an enterprise in the 
zone would only be subject to a 15% rate of taxation on income 
unencumbered by the burdensome national CICT tax (up to 69% 
rate), CICIT tax, (5 to 34.5% rate), and Joint Ventures Income 
Tax (30%). since corresponding tax rates in other parts of 
southeast Asia, such as Hong Kong, are higher, the lower tax 
rate would be a highly desirable condition for investment in 
that part of the world. 
In addition to an initial low rate ~f taxation, the 
special zones also offer "special preferential treatment" if 
the enterprise is (a) established within 2 years of the pro-
mUlgation of the special zone regulations, or (b) has invest-
ment of us $5 million or more, or (c) involves higher tech-
nology or a longer cycle of capital turnover. 70 What that 
treatment will be has not yet been defined. Again, technology 
is stressed as highly desirable in the industries the P. R. C. 
seeks to attract. 
Article 16 of the special zone regulations provides an 
exemption from income tax on the profits reinvested in the 
special zones for five years or longer. 71 Although not expli-
citly stated, presumably a recapture provision similar to that 
of the Joint Ventures Income Tax Law would apply in the case 
where the investments were withdrawn before the end of the 
five year period. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. art. 14. 
71 Id. art. 16. This may be essential since it has been estimated 
that it would otherwise take at least 5 years for a venture in China to 
yield a return sufficient to warrant the investment. 
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Double Taxation 
One other problem the P.R.C. has tried to solve through 
tax iQcentives in its Joint Ventures laws has been the double 
taxation of income derived from China. Double taxation arises 
where two sovereigns claim to exercise tax jurisdiction over 
the same entity. Thus, absent a provision eliminating double 
taxation, an American corporation participating in a joint 
venture in China may be required to pay both U.S. and Chinese 
taxes on the same income. 
The Chinese tax incentives may only be effective if the 
laws of the investor's country of residence make provision for 
the elimination of double taxation. There are two methods for 
eliminating double taxation -- the foreign tax credit system 
and the foreign tax exemption system. Under the tax credit 
system,the Chinese tax incentives will generally have no 
incentive effect for a foreign investor with foreign invest-
ments only in China. Any reduction in Chinese income tax 
liability is offset on a "dollar-for-dollar" basis by a corre-
sponding increase in income tax owed to the country of resi-
dence. The overall tax liability of the investor is therefore 
not reduced by the Chinese tax incentive. 
To avoid the problem of double taxation and provide tax 
neutrality for residents of China, the P.R.C. has enacted an 
income tax credit against taxes owed to China for lncome taxes 
'd h . 72 . . t pal to ot er countrles. For U.S. lnvestors, lncome axes 
paid to China may also be eligible for the U. S. foreign tax 
credit. 73 This would be a welcome change from the non-credit 
status of the CICT. 74 
72 Joint Ventures Income Tax law, article 16. Note that tax neutrality is 
also provided by taxing non-residents only on income derived from China. 
73 United States I.R.C., §§ 902,903 et seq. 
74 Gelatt, supra note 10, Pomp & Surrey, supra note 6. See Reynolds, 
supra note 5. 
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In the united states, the CICT may be deducted from gross 
income under I.R.C. § 162 as an ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expense of a trade or business, or under I.R.C. § 164 as 
a deductible foreign tax. However, the beneifts of a deduc-
tion under one of these sections is not the IIdollar-for-dollar ll 
offsetting of tax liability that the foreign tax credit af-
fords. consequently, there remains some degree of double 
taxation of u.s. investments in China. 
For foreign investors in tax exemption countries, such as 
most European countries, the Chinese tax incentives generally 
will have an incentive effect since there is no residence 
country income tax on that income to offset the reduction in 
Chinese taxes. 
However, there exist exceptions and special situations 
where a foreign investor from a country which uses a IItax 
credit ll system may still experience an incentive effect from 
China's tax system. For example, tax incentives may be effec-
tive incentives to investment where the tax~ayer is allowed to 
average foreign income over many countries 5 or where foreign 
income tax is deferred to a later tax year. 76 
As may be seen, the tax incentive effect experienced by 
foreign investors in China will depend on the interaction of 
their resident countries' tax laws with the Chinese tax pro-
visions discussed above. A detailed analysis of that inter-
action, not attempted in this article, would be necessary for 
a full understanding of the incentive effect of the Chinese 
tax laws on specific investments made by American and other 
foreign investors. 
75 See generally McDANIEL & AULT, INTRODUCTION TO UNITED STATES INTERNA-
TIONAL TAXATION 69-70 (1977). 
76 The foreign investor may derive some benefit from the deferral of 
income tax allowed when dividends from a subsidiary corporation are delayed. 
The tax on the income is deferred until such dividends are remitted to the 
parent corporation or investor in their county of residence. 
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Finally, an al ternati ve means to provide tax incentives 
that has yet to be used may be tax treaties or agreements. 
Tax treaties 6r agreements may be used to alter or exempt 
enterprises from' laws that would otherwise affect foreign 
individuals and businesses in China. 77 They may also provide 
for consistency in the definition of terms, tax bases, and 
applicable rates. No such treaty has been concluded between 
China and the U.S. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that the P.R.C. employs a tax system which 
embraces several independently operating national and local 
taxes. A foreign investor in China may have to deal with both 
levels within the Chinese tax system. 78 The Joint Ventures 
Income Tax is one of the P.R.C.'s first attempts to deal with 
foreign investment on Chinese soil. While foreign investors 
in China cannot afford to ignore the impact of the various 
national and local taxes upon foreign investments in China, 
their primary concern may be most effectively focused upon the 
Joint Ventures Income Tax and the national sales tax (the 
Consolidated Industrial & Commercial Tax). 
Other laws may follow dealing with foreign enterprises in 
forms other than joint ventures. However, it appears that 
most investment will occur in the form of contractual joint 
ventures since this represents the most beneficial form of 
investment to the P.R.C. and is therefore the most likely to 
receive official approval. Under this form of joint venture 
the P.R.C. would obtain all the assets of the venture upon 
termination of the contract. In addition, the stable short-
term environment and early tax incentives offer an attractive 
77 Individual Income Tax law, art. IV, § 8. Joint Ventures Income Tax 
law, art. 16. 
78 Local taxes may only be avoided if the province involved decides to 
maximize the incentive it offers by reducing local taxes to zero percent. 
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inducement to the foreign investor who is looking for a worth-
while return on his investment in China. 
By offering incentives to certain joint ventures the new 
tax system may also be viewed as a kind of screening process. 
By initiating this screening process at the contract level, 
the P.R.C. can exert a modicum of control over the kinds of 
investments that are deemed most desirable. For example, 
particularly high priority will be afforded to those enter-
prises which (1) use "up-to-date technology"; (2) exploit oil, 
gas, and other natural resources of China; or (3) are "located 
in outlying, underdeveloped areas." 
In conclusion, it may be observed that the tax incentives 
of the P.R.C. represent a balance between tax revenues and tax 
inducements to investment of technology and assets in China --
a balance that has been struck in favor of the inducements. 
China is also apparently experimenting with its many taxes in 
order to maximize the efficacy of its tax incentive network. 
Finally, China's tax incentives may only be effective induce-
ments to desired foreign investments if the laws of the inves-
tor's country of residence do not cancel out the incenti ve 
effects by adding its own taxes upon the income derived from 
joint ventures in China. 
David L. Lau 
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